Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) have truly gained attention in object recognition and object classification in particular. When being implemented on Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), deeper networks are more accurate than shallow ones. Residual Networks (ResNets) are one of the deepest CNN architectures used in various fields including safety-critical ones. GPUs have proven to be the major accelerator for CNN models. However, modern GPUs are prone to radiation-induced soft errors, which is a serious issue in safety-compliant systems. In this work, we analyze and propose an approach to address the reliability of ResNet on GPUs. We firstly analyze three popular ResNet models, explicitly, ResNet-50, ResNet-101, and ResNet-152 through NVIDIA's fault injector, SASSIFI. We perform an indepth analysis of the model from the perspective of layer and kernel vulnerability. Then, we experimentally show the vulnerability of ResNet models and identify the most vulnerable portions. Finally, we validate our solution, which is a selective-hardening technique, through hardening the worth-hardening kernels to avoid unnecessary overheads. Our strategy is demonstrated to mask up to 93.38% of the injected errors with performance overhead less than 5.35%. Furthermore, the percentage of the errors causing misclassifications can be reduced from 4.2% to 0.104%, thereby significantly improving the model's reliability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) are a type of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) that have been found to be effective and popular in many different domains, especially in object recognition [1] . As a rule of thumb in DNNs, deeper models (i.e., having more layers) are more accurate than the shallow ones. Residual Networks (ResNet) are known with their depth (i.e. able to accept more layers without degradation); and thus, they have become a distinguished type of CNN, especially for image classification of object recognition.
As ResNet is believed to be one of the best CNN models used in classification tasks. Moreover, ResNet is the backbone for the modern region-based object detectors, such as Faster R-CNN and Deformable ConvNets [2] . These detectors are widely used in safety-critical systems, such as The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Cheng Qian .
self-driving cars [3] and space applications [4] . Therefore, analyzing and addressing the reliability of such systems is essential.
DNNs models are executed on a wide range of DNN accelerators [5] , including Graphics Processing Units (GPU), Google's Tensor Processing Unit (TPU) [6] , and FPGA [7] . Among these accelerators, GPUs are currently the most prominent and dominant devices to accelerate DNN algorithms [8] , [9] . GPUs executing CNNs now are used in mission-critical applications, which require a high level of reliability against data corruption and their failure rates must be as low as possible. However, modern GPUs have been shown to be extremely susceptible to data corruption by soft errors [10] , [11] . Thus, this unreliability will affect a DNN model executed on these GPUs in certain environments.
It must be noted that Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are inherently tolerant to faults at some levels. This is because ANNs mimic the human brain and they are able to tolerate some level of neuron faults or noise (incomplete data) during computation [12] , [13] . Nevertheless, modern DNN systems have deeper hierarchy of layers and much more operations than traditional ANNs. Consequently, the prior studies cannot extend much insight into error propagation of the state-of-theart DNNs, such as ResNet. [14] , [15] .
There have been a number of studies [10] , [15] - [18] on the reliability of DNNs. However, considering the fact that fault tolerance depends on hardware that executes the DNN model and the topology of this network [14] , we can derive two factors that should be considered: (i) a variety of DNN architectures have been proposed featuring different workflows, characteristics, and behaviors. (ii) these DNNs are implemented on a wide range of DNN accelerators (i.e., GPUs, ASICs, etc.), each of which has its own components and execution flow. Therefore, one cannot generalize a specific DNN's reliability case to other architectures.
Software-based hardening is one of the most effective and cheapest approaches to improve the reliability of safety-critical and high-performance systems, particularly, for modular-based algorithms (e.g., DNNs). The most efficient and popular software-based solutions for soft-errors mitigation in GPUs include (1) modular redundancy techniques, such as Duplication Modular Redundancy (DMR) and Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) [19] ;
(2) Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) [20] . Nevertheless, the unnecessary overhead associated with these techniques is always the biggest challenge, which is regarded as a violation and impractical for real-time applications.
In this work, we analyze and improve the reliability of ResNet models implemented on GPUs; and we also find out how, when, and where soft errors can cause misclassification. The main contributions of this paper are as follows: (1) experimentally investigating whether the number of layers in a model has an impact in model's reliability by examining three different ResNet models; (2) a thorough analysis on the vulnerability of ResNet's kernels, the functions that are executed on GPUs; (3) an in-depth analysis and evaluation on the vulnerability of ResNet's layer and how errors propagate; (4) an efficient selective hardening solution for CNN models on GPUs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews related work and tells how our work differs. Section III provides a brief background on ResNets, GPUs and the mechanism of soft errors in GPUs. Section IV describes our experimental setup. Section V analyzes the reliability of ResNet models and reports our findings. Section VI presents the proposed solution and validates it. Finally, Section VII provides concluding remarks and plans for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review previous work on DNNs' reliability. As mentioned in Section I, in the literature work, we are going to look at two key factors, DNN architecture and DNN accelerator that have been considered in each work. G. Li et al. considered one of the spearheading works that analyzed and evaluated the characteristics of DNNs [15] . This work has brought a comprehensive analysis of many important concepts related to DNNs, especially, understanding error propagation in modern DNN systems. The biggest take away of this study is that the reliability of DNNs depends on several factors: topology of the network, data types, values, data reuses and types, positions, and numbers layers. Although this study has considered four CNN architectures (AlexNet, CaffeNet, NiN, and ConvNet) to explain the reliability issues in CNN models, it uses a specific DNN accelerator, Eyeriss [21] , which is an ASIC design. However, different DNN accelerators have different responses/sensitivity to faults. Here we show two main differences between this work and ours: (i) while this work considers ASIC as the DNN accelerator, our work considers GPU instead; (ii) we study a modern and much deeper CNN architecture (i.e., ResNet).
L. Weigel et al. analyzed the reliability of a feature descriptor for object detection called Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG) implemented on a GPU [16] . Although this work proposed the concept of Kernel Vulnerability Factor (KVF) that we adopt in our study to identify the vulnerable kernels of our model. It is worth noting that KVF is a completely application-dependent technique, which means that HOG's KVF evaluation cannot be applied to ResNet architecture. Therefore, our work is different from this work: (i) we study the behavior and characteristics of a different GPU application (i.e., ResNet architecture); (ii) we study errors propagation through model's layers to track SDC errors before the final output, whereas HOG does not have layers in its structure.
Santos et al. analyzed and investigated radiation-induced errors in GPUs that could impact the reliability of CNN models [10] . They examined three different NVIDIA-based GPUs, namely (Kepler, Maxwell, and Pascal). However, as the authors clearly stated they have not injected faults into the Maxwell GPU (i.e. Terga X1) by software fault-injection tools. This means that this microarchitecture has been evaluated only through beam experiment without fault injection to understand insights on how it behaves. Keeping in mind that, Maxwell microarchitecture has a very different internal architecture than other two microarchitectures, for instance, it features mixed-precision format, in both computing and storage, while Kepler (the only architecture that has been evaluated by software fault injection in this paper) does not feature mixedprecision. Moreover, this study considered three CNN architectures, YOLO, Faster R-CNN, and ResNet. We can notice that this work has evaluated ResNet's reliability indeed. However, YOLO and Fast R-CNN are object detection models, while ResNet is an object classification model. The fundamental point is that the detection and classification are greatly different in their structures and workflows, for instance, based on our analysis results, Shortcut and Normalization layers in ResNet models are among the most vulnerable layers, while these layers do not even exist in YOLO and Fast R-CNN. Santos et al. studied the ResNet model by measuring the Precision and Recall of the corrupted output after the beaming experiment, but without getting insights on how errors propagate through ResNet layers and down to its kernels. In our study, we present a comprehensive analysis of ResNet in order to identify the worth protecting portion of it. Our work is different from this work in several points, we study: 1) whether the depth of the model has impact; 2) errors propagation in ResNet, which helps us determine the vulnerable layers of the model; 3) kernel vulnerability of ResNet, which leads us to confidently identify the only code parts within each layer.
III. BACKGROUND A. DEEP RESIDUAL NETWORKS
Residual Network (ResNet) is the CNN architecture that won the first place in ILSVRC and COCO 2015 competitions in ImageNet (classification, detection, and localization) and in COCO (detection and segmentation) [22] . ResNet has been proposed to deepen the network without impacting the prediction accuracy by introducing residual modules (i.e., bottleneck modules) between layers. The diagram of ResNet architecture is shown in Fig. 1 . As can been seen, these three models share the same architecture and the only difference is the number of repetitions of the residual modules in each group (see at the bottom of Fig. 1 ). For instance, ResNet-101 has 101 Convolutional (Conv.) layers, 33 Shortcut layers, and a single layer of Max-pooling, Average-pooling, and Softmax at the end of the model as a classifier. There is also a batch-normalization layer that follows each convolutional layer; and an activation function layer at the end of each convolutional and Shortcut layers. The residual module is the key idea of the ResNet, as shown in Fig. 2 . Each residual module contains two paths. One is a direct communication path of the input feature (a.k.a., a Shortcut connection) for an identity mapping; the other path performs a three-convolutional operation on the input to obtain the residual of the feature map; and finally, the features on the two paths will be added together. Therefore, the basic structure of ResNet is (1 × 1 Conv, 3 × 3 Conv, 1 × 1 Conv) and then Shortcut layer [22] . This structure will be repeated over and over until right before the classifier, i.e., the Average-pooling layer, (see Fig. 1 ). As will be further explained in Section V-D, we found that this unique structure has an influence on the layer's resilience. The second 1 × 1 Conv. is used to preserve the dimensionality of the output feature maps as same as the input feature maps, in order to be able to perform the addition before the activation function (i.e., ReLU) as in Fig. 2 . However, the activation function of the second 1 × 1-convolutional layer is linear, while all other layers have non-linear activation functions.
Part of the ResNet algorithm on GPU consists of several kernels that cooperate to accomplish the task. There is significant diversity among these kernels, from memory requirements to the number of instructions to the time they take to be executed. Based on Caffe [23] , a deep learning framework, ResNet models are composed of various kernels. Table 1 lists the pairs of ResNet kernels with their corresponding layers, which were used in the inference phase through Darknet. Each of these kernels has a specific task to perform in the model's computations. For example, Im2col_gpu (i.e., imageto-column), is the kernel that prepares the convolutional operations to be performed as matrix-multiplication operations, by laying out all positions of the input, that corresponding to each filter, into matrices. [11] . Different GPUs have differing numbers of SMs and all SMs in a GPU share Level 2 cache. Each SM has the ability to execute several threads in parallel through its CUDA cores, which are the main processing units in NVIDIA-based devices.
B. GPU ARCHITECTURE
GPU has its own control logic (internal blocks scheduler and dispatcher) that allocate the kernels. It is also connected to the systems' memory via the PCI-E connector, where data is transferred to and from it [24] . Each CUDA core can execute only one thread in a clock cycle with dedicated registers from the register file [25] . The concept of high performance in GPUs comes from massive on-chip parallelism, which perfectly fits the DNN algorithms, such as ResNets. This is the reason that gigantic GPU manufacturers like NVIDIA designated specific architectures of their GPUs for dedicated deep learning to accelerate the training and inference process.
It is worth mentioning that high-end NVIDIA GPUs include some architectural solutions specifically introduced to increase the reliability of memory resources (register files, L1 and L2 caches) by featuring a hardware technique called Single Error Correction Double Error Detection (SECDED) ECC. In our study, however, as we use NVIDIA's GeForce (GTX 750 Ti), which is Maxwell microarchitecture, it does not support ECC feature [26] .
C. SOFT ERRORS IN GPUs
Whether in space or on earth, radiation strikes are able to affect the behaviors of modern GPUs [11] ; and this can eventually lead to failure or data corruption in computation [27] . Radiation-induced soft errors are one of the major sources of unreliability in modern systems. This is mainly due to high-energy particles striking electronic devices including GPUs and causing them to malfunction [28] . It is worth noting that failure tolerance in safety-critical systems is limited to 10 Failures in Time (FIT), which equals to a single error in 10 9 hours of operations [29] .
Soft errors in DNN accelerators (GPU is one of them) are far worse than in other electronic devices and deserve more attention for two reasons: (1) the complex memory hierarchy that is used for improved latency [30] and (2) the massively-parallel structure of the GPUs, which tends to spread a single fault to multiple faults [27] .
When a particle hit memory elements (i.e., the green sections in Fig. 3 ) of a GPU, it can impact many threads that share the same storage component. When a particle hit functional units of a GPU (i.e. ALU (INST) or Floating-point (FP) units) (see Fig. 3 ), it generates temporary-voltage pulses, Single Event Transients (SETs). A SET can propagate through the GPU logic components and might be captured by a storage component (i.e. latch or flip-flop of the Result Queue) [31] unless some fault detection technique is applied. SETs might be masked in the middle of the computations; and thus, they will not be considered errors in the memory elements [11] .
The generated fault may alter data values or logic operations and cause errors, such as Silent Data Corruption (SDC), and application crash or system hang i.e., Detected Unrecoverable Error (DUE), but it may also be masked and cause no observable error, which is called Masked errors [32] . Errors can propagate through different processes (layers in our case) until they reach the output of the program and eventually cause problems, such as object misclassification. Therefore, a radiation-induced soft error in GPU is a serious issue in safety-critical systems.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP A. CNN MODEL
As our goal is to study the impact of soft errors in object recognition models, we considered three pre-trained classification models, i.e., 50/101/152-layer ResNets available on the Darknet framework [33] . The reason for studying three ResNet models (i.e., not only one) is to experimentally investigate whether the depth of the model has influence.
ResNet models were trained on the ImageNet classification dataset that consists of 1000 classes. The models were trained on more than a million training images [22] . We use these pre-trained models to make the inference. We download each model's weights and implement them on the Darknet framework to obtain the original accuracy before performing the fault injection process.
B. FAULT-INJECTION SETUP
The fault-injection process has been conducted using the NVIDIA's fault injector, SASSIFI [34] , which allows us to understand and analyze the error occurrence and its propagation in ResNet models. SASSIFI injects errors at the GPU's Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) visible state, such as general-purpose registers (GPRs), predicate registers (PR), condition-code registers (CC), and memory values [34] . SASSIFI has three error-injection modes to use: Register File (RF), Instruction Output Address (IOA), and Instruction Output Value (IOV) [34] . As the name suggests, RF mode injects faults into the register files of the GPU, while IOA and IOV modes inject faults into the functional units (i.e., FP, INST, and load-store units). The transient faults of each mode are modeled by flipping bits (as we further explain in Section IV-C) in the outputs of executing instructions. More specifically, IOA flips the address bits whereas IOV flips the value bits of the destination registers (live state). In this study, we consider all three modes.
Nevertheless, selecting an injection mode completely depends on the type of study one wants to perform. In other words, based on the evaluation metric that we want to evaluate, we choose the appropriate injection mode.
For any error injection campaign, the error model must be clearly specified. That is because it defines what kind of errors to be injected and where to inject them in our model. SASSIFI provides several bit-flip models, including single bit flip, multiple bit flips, random value, and zero value [34] .
We consider transient faults that occur in the datapath (functional units) and memories. It is worth mentioning that, based on the designated purpose for the specific register, we inject faults. Therefore, in some destination registers, such as CC and PR, only one bit of the destination bits is randomly selected to be flipped. Whereas in other destination registers, such as GPRs, more than a bit can be flipped. In our study, we choose single bit-flip and random value models for the three injection modes. The reason we choose these two BFMs is that single-bit flip is realistic for memory errors [34] , whereas, random value represents all other three BFMs [16] .
After our fault-injection setup is ready, we inject 1000 injections at each of SASSFI's three modes (i.e., RF, IOA, and IOV) and for each BFM. This number of injections was enough to guarantee that the worst-case statistical error bars at 95% confidence are at 1.96% [34] . It is the level that increasing the number of injections does not change the statistics anymore.
C. ERROR MODEL
In this study, we measure two evaluation metrics: (1) Architectural Vulnerability Factor (AVF), which is the probability that a single fault on that component will result in an error. It is used to study how programs react to errors in memory components at hardware level [35] . (2) Program Vulnerability Factor (PVF), which is the probability that a single fault that alters the result of instruction will propagate to a program output. It is used to study applications behaviors to errors in their instructions at software level. [10] . Once we inject errors with RF mode, we measure AVF of the register file. Once we inject errors with IOA and IOV, we measure PVF of the algorithm.
After the faults are injected and the program output is compared with the golden output (i.e., the pure outcome), one of three categories is expected: Masked, DUE, or SDC. Note that when we want to study the error propagation in our model, only SDC errors is our interest. Because once errors cause crashes or hangs (i.e., DUEs), they do not propagate to the next layer. Also, Masked errors will immediately be masked where they occurred.
To better understand the concept of SDC errors and their propagation through layers, we further classify the SDC errors into three categories:
• Critical SDC: the error that propagates and reaches program output, and modifies the probabilities vector, thus, impacts the object's rank (i.e., misclassification).
• Non_critical SDC: the error that propagates and reaches program output and modifies the probabilities, but does not change the object's rank, tolerable SDC, (i.e., it does not cause object misclassification).
• Prop_Masked SDC: the error that propagates but does not reach the program's final output (i.e., it is masked in some layer). This should not be confused with Masked error, which does not propagate at all.
V. FAULT-INJECTION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the results obtained by our fault-injection campaign and analyze them. To evaluate the resilience of the ResNet model, we perform a detailed sensitivity analysis from several perspectives by evaluating four evaluation metrics as follows:
• The influence of the model's depth • Kernels vulnerability analysis • Layers vulnerability analysis As we have not noticed any significant difference between the chosen BFMs, both single BFM and random BFM would reflect the same observations. Therefore, a single bit flip is the error model that has been chosen for our analysis.
A. MODEL'S DEPTH ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we investigate the depth of the model (i.e., the number of layers in a model). To achieve this, we evaluate three ResNet models. To study the model depth, we considered the RF mode of SASSFI; this is due to the fact that we are mainly intended to find out the impact of using a component in a radioactive environment for a longer time (i.e., more layers) of ResNet models. Therefore, injecting errors in the Register File was enough to observe the difference. RF mode injections allow us to measure the AVF of the Register File.
The main advantage of measuring AVF is that it allows us to quantify the importance of enabling the protection techniques, such as ECC and parity, that are used for the register file. This means that if the probability of the errors (i.e., SDCs) is as low as that can be tolerated in our model (i.e., ResNet), then the energy cost of enabling these techniques may not be a good idea [34] .
It is worth mentioning that the execution time of the same part of the parallel code (e.g., kernel) is different from model to another. Table 2 lists the total number of layers in each model and their corresponding execution times, taken from the original paper of ResNet [22] . From SASSIFI perspective, however, once a fault is injected (i.e., a bit is flipped) in the register file, it will be randomly spread across time and space, among allocated registers. Therefore, to fairly represent the errors in these three models and also to achieve the highest level of confidence in each model, we have injected faults to each of which with different number of faults, according to the time taken, which is measured by Floating-Point Operations per Second (FLOPS), as presented in Table 2 . first glance, we can observe that the number of layers in the three models impact the resilience of the classification differently. As Table 2 shows, ResNet-152 has the highest FLOPS (11.3×10 9 ). From model's performance perspective (i.e., accuracy and training), the model benefits from increased FLOPS as it goes deeper [22] . From a reliability perspective, however, FLOPS indicates the execution time taken by each model. Therefore, the extra layers in ResNet-152 increase the error rate compared to the other two models (almost higher 2× of the ResNet-101and 3× of ResNet-50). Thus, it is reasonable to believe that the time each model takes to be executed represents the time in which the model will be exposed to a radiation source. Another significant point is that injecting faults into each of these three models generates much more DUE errors than SDC errors, and this will be discussed in Section V-B.
To conclude it, based on the obtained results, we have experimentally proven that the deeper the model, the higher the number of errors it can generate. Thus, as ResNet-152 has more layers than ResNet-50 and ResNet-101, it produces more errors.
B. KERNEL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we analyze the resilience of the ResNet model from a kernel's perspective. The part of the source code executed on the GPU is called the kernel. In order to demonstrate how different kernels, have different vulnerabilities and how they eventually contribute to the program output (i.e., object classification), we have collected all the static kernels needed for inference (training kernels are not included). As shown in Table 1 , eleven kernels are used to make predictions (i.e., inferences) for the ResNet's pre-trained model on the Darknet framework. Once the faults are injected, using the SASSIFI tool, we use the obtained details related to the kernels of the injected model to pursue our analysis. To evaluate the susceptibility of each kernel, we measure the kernel vulnerability factor (KVF). As introduced by [16] , the KVF means the probability of faults in a kernel to affect the model's computations, which could impact the output of the model. Fig. 5 shows the measured values of KVF in the three modes: RF, IOA, and IOV. We should mention VOLUME 8, 2020 that in Fig 5, the probabilities of the whole sub-graph (i.e., Fig. 5a , 5b, or 5c) sum up to 100%, not each kernel's vertical bars. This is because KVF is calculated by dividing the number of errors (i.e., SDCs, DUEs, and Masked) that have been observed by the total number of injected errors (1000 in our case). The reason is that all these kernels are used in every single run of the model, while faults are injected randomly into them. In other words, we do not specify the number of faults for each kernel. Instead, it is randomly performed for the whole program (ResNet), which is divided up into kernels.
By looking at Fig. 5a , which is the result obtained by RF mode injections, we notice that the generated DUE errors are much more than SDC errors in all kernels, as previously mentioned in Section V-A. We do believe that there are two reasons behind that: (1) since the injections with RF mode will be in index registers and addresses for memory stores, RF injections are performed at a lower level; and thus, it is reasonable to stop the program execution in a form of hang or crash (i.e., DUE). This finding agrees with the one that has been found in [10] ; (2) if the register file produces corrupted data, this data might be unused or obsolete. Also, this finding proves the finding presented in [16] . Therefore, injected faults using RF mode in each kernel produces less than 4% SDCs, whereas some kernels, such as Shortcut_gpu, Normalize_gpu, and Add_bias produce DUEs at least double or three times amount of SDCs that they produce.
In contrast with RF mode, in IOA and IOV modes (i.e., Fig. 5b and 5c ), kernels are more likely to generate SDC errors rather than DUE errors. The reason may be injection at a RF site is considered the lowest level of injection, while injection at IOA and IOV sites are performed at higher levels. Additionally, The output of the currently executing instruction is often used by the subsequent instruction [16] . Therefore, SDC can be propagated to the next instruction until it reaches the output instruction.
In this context, we find that the top-4 vulnerable kernels for the ResNet model are Normalize_gpu, Add_bias, Short-cut_gpu, and Im2col_gpu in all three modes. Other kernels vary between not producing SDC and/or DUE errors at all (such as Avgpool kernel) and producing a small number of DUEs and/or SDCs in all models (such as Fill_gpu and Maxpool kernels). And thus, they have very high resilience to soft errors. Furthermore, we can notice that more than one kernel can contribute to building one CNN layer, such as Convolutional and Shortcut layers. For instance, Short-cut_gpu, Scale_bias, and Copy_gpu are the kernels together building the Shortcut layer and so on. From another angle, this statistically helps to determine which layer is more prone to faults, and then to make a better decision in error mitigation step to avoid unnecessary overheads.
It is worth mentioning that the Softmax kernel does not appear on the kernels' vulnerability graph. This is basically because Softmax has very few CUDA instructions and its execution time on the GPU is extremely short. Therefore, it has not been injected.
To conclude it, static kernels of the ResNet model have different vulnerabilities against soft errors. From Fig. 5 , we can determine which kernel produces more errors than the others to be nominated as the best candidates to harden. Based on our comprehensive analysis, we exclusively select the vulnerable kernels to be hardened for a cost-effective solution instead of duplicating the whole model, which is an extremely expensive technique and undesirable feature in real-time systems that prefer low latency techniques.
C. LAYER VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, we analyze error propagation in the ResNet model through its different layers. As shown in Fig. 1 , ResNet-50, ResNet-101, and ResNet-152 have the same structure; and the only difference is the depth. Consequently, we choose to study error propagation on ResNet-50, which is composed of 50 Convolutional layers interleaved with 16 Shortcut (i.e., layers with the letter R, for Residual), 1 Max-pooling (1 M), 1 Average-pooling (66 Av), and 1 Softmax layer (68).
The input (i.e., image) is fed from the first layer as a matrix with the size of 256×256×3 and it goes through these layers, all the way to the final output to become a vector of probabilities that will be provided by Softmax function. To trace error propagation through layers of ResNet-50, a further portion of source code was required to obtain data of each layer from layer 0 to layer 68. This data will be compared to the golden (fault-free) data, and the layer in which the error occurred is identified afterward. After identifying the injected layer, we can trace the way errors propagate to the next layers of the ResNet until the error is masked at some hidden layer or reaches the final output.
It is worth noting that in this subsection, as we are more interested in errors that propagate (i.e., not errors that cause crashes or hangs) and the way they propagate through layers, we will be focused on the types of SDC errors as well (i.e., Critical and Non_critical). Figs. 6, 7, and 8 show the layer vulnerability values (i.e., AVF values for injections into the RF site and PVF values for injections into IOA and IOV sites, respectively). For each layer, we calculate the corresponding DUE, Masked, Critical SDC, and Non_critical SDC, as explained in Section IV-C. More precisely, we measure AVF and PVF values for the given errors to identify the layers that are likely to produce errors that crucially change the model's prediction (i.e., object misclassification).
When injecting faults in RF mode (Fig. 6) , layers tend to produce small amounts of Non_critical SDC, while layers very rarely result in Critical SDCs. Where Non_critical SDCs in all layers is on the average of 3.2% AVF, only a few layers (1M, 4, and 8) produce tiny amounts of Critical SDCs on the average of 0.2% AVF. This means that RF injections do not have a big impact on the layer's resilience against SDC errors. However, layers produce a various amount of DUE errors based on the same reasons mentioned in Section V-B.
Although layers mask about half of the SDC errors that have been injected into them, 24% of injected errors were never read (N_R) in RF mode injections (see Fig. 6 ). This type of error is the one that has been mentioned in Section V-B, which is obsolete or unused.
While injecting faults into instruction output (IOA and IOV), on the other hand, layers tend to produce large amounts of SDC (Critical and Non_critical) errors, which affects their resilience. However, the percentage of DUE errors generated by instruction-output injections are less than that in RF mode. Therefore, we discuss and analyze these two modes in more detail.
For IOA mode ( Fig. 7) , layers tend to mask the majority of the errors (at least 55% of the injected faults have been masked for each layer). However, they still generate Non_critical SDCs with approximately 12.9% PVF values; and a number of layers generate Critical SDCs with PVF values on an average of 1.1%, which is quite high in safety-critical systems. Whereas layers produce various percentages of DUE errors, the highest PVF in layers 0, 9, 11, 18 , and 49 averages between 20% and 37%. Nevertheless, about half of the layers have not affected by DUE errors, such as layer 6, 14, 19, and 21).
For IOV mode (Fig. 8) , alternatively, most of the layers generate Critical SDCs with PVF values on an average of 4.2%, significantly impacting the model's reliability, which is an unacceptable percentage. Statistically, layers 0, 4, 8, and 12 contribute with roughly 37% of the overall Critical SDCs of the model. Moreover, these same layers produce the largest proportion of Non_critical SDCs and Masked errors. These findings indicate that they are the most vulnerable layers of the model. Among SASSIFI's three modes, IOV is considered the highest level of the injections. That is the reason injecting layers through IOV mode unlikely to terminate the model execution (i.e., DUEs). Instead, it can easily produce errors at model's final output (i.e., SDCs). Consequently, the average of DUEs for each layer is not more than 5.7% PVF.
As can be seen in Fig 7 and 8 , for both IOA and IOV modes, layers situated immediately prior to the layers with letter R (for Residual), such as layer 4, 8, and 12, generate more errors than other layers in the network. Furthermore, these layers represent the second 1 × 1-convolutional layers of the residual module (see Fig. 2 ), and as explained in Section III-A, type of the activation function within these layers is linear (i.e., identity mapping), which equalizes the output to the input, maintaining the same size. This observation interprets the structure of the ResNet model itself, where these layers possess a larger input size and/or larger number of the filters. It is not surprising as the execution time taken by each layer is corresponding to the expose time in a radioactive environment; and thus, the longer the layer is exposed, the higher the error rate. In both instruction-output injections, layers closer to the output layer produce proportionally fewer errors. This is because the input size starts at the first layer with 256 × 256 × 3 matrix; and afterward, it is gradually reduced until at the output layer with the size 8 × 8 × 2048 before it becomes a vector of 1000 probabilities.
The vast majority of the SDC errors (of all categories) at the ResNet output come from faults that occurred either at a Conv. or Shortcut layer. All the convolutional layers invoke the same kernels and have the same AVF and PVF (considering the input size and number of the filters). However, as shown in Figs. 6, 7 , and 8, the probability of an injection to impact the model output always depends on the layer's position in the network, as in layers 4, 8, and 12 that situated right before Shortcut layers.
Softmax is considered the most reliable layer. Besides it does not produce any errors, it masks most of the masked SDCs. We believe that there are two reasons: (1) unlike most of the layers, Softmax is invoked only once, which reduces its execution time that errors could occur in it; (2) considering its functionality, Softmax produces a vector of probabilities that sum up to one. So, even if the input value to Softmax was changed due to SDC, a probability percentage may still remain the same and the error will be masked in this case. Moreover, the vast majority of the output-probability scores are zeros due to the fact that the classified object should have similarity with a few other objects out of the 1000 classes required for classification. This confirms the intrinsic feature of the ANNs, fault tolerance. This means that in case there are negative values, they will be automatically masked.
VI. SOFT ERROR MITIGATION APPROACH AND VALIDATION
Following the detailed analysis discussed in Section V and based on our analysis results, we propose an efficient selective-hardening TMR strategy for the most vulnerable portions of our model (i.e., kernels). The main idea of our TMR technique is to triplicate the selected kernel with three identical versions and their results will be compared by a voter. Unless the voter generates the same result, a fault has occurred. 
A. HARDENED KERNEL EVALUATION
In this subsection, we validate the hardening solution by re-evaluating the kernels that have been selectively hardened, after injecting faults into them. Fig. 9 show the percentage of Masked, DUE, and SDC errors on each selectively-hardened kernel.
By looking at the hardened kernels (i.e., Im2col_gpu, Shortcut_gpu, Add_bias, and Normalize_gpu) in Fig. 9a and 9c, regardless of whether or not impacting the final output, we find that every single produced SDC by each of these kernels was masked. This indicates that our solution has achieved the desired task, with both RF and IOV injections. Whereas with IOA mode, Fig. 9b shows a very tiny amount (the overall percentage is 0.26%) of SDC errors in some of the hardened kernels, specifically, Im2col_gpu, Shortcut_gpu, and Nor-malize_gpu. We do believe that it is due to strikes at our voter itself, even if the probability limited, it is still possible. However, in the layer evaluation phase (i.e., next subsection), we further analyze to find out whether the produced SDC is considered critical (i.e., whether impacted the final output or not).
It is important to declare that our proposed technique does not significantly affect model's DUE error rate. Therefore, we find that the percentages of the DUE errors in the range between 1% and 2% KVF in the unhardened versions, and in the range between 1.5% and 2.8% KVF in the hardened versions of these kernels.
As our hardening strategy seems quite efficient at masking SDCs, the next level of validation is to show the trade-off between model's performance and overheads imposed by the proposed solution to confirm the efficiency. We have measured the performance overhead for further validation and investigation of our proposed solution. This is done by calculating the execution time of each of the chosen kernels before and after hardening; and then, the overall time (performance) overhead for the whole model before and after hardening. As Table 3 lists, the overall execution time has increased only by 5.344%, while greatly improved model's reliability. Our solution eliminated the unnecessary overhead while increasing the CNN reliability, and reaching a satisfactory level of a trade-off between the hardening efficacy and models' performance.
It is worth noting that, our hardening strategy also indirectly improved the reliability of some unhardened kernels, such as Scale_bias and Activation kernels. For instance, let us take Scale_bias kernel, by comparing the resilience of this kernel, before and after applying our solution for the same injection mode (e.g., Fig. 5b and Fig. 9b ), we find that its resilience has noticeably increased, where its KVF value has reduced from 5.35% in Fig. 5b to 0.27% in Fig. 9b . The reason as we believe is the position of the Scale_bias that is always invoked immediately after Normalize_gpu kernel, which has been hardened so that it always receives a correct input from Normalize_gpu.
B. LAYER VULNERABILITY EVALUATION
In this subsection, we validate our proposed solution from a layer perspective by re-analyzing the layer's resilience after our hardening technique is applied to the ResNet model. As error propagation through layers is the main target in this phase, we measure all types of SDC errors as well, including Critical, Non_critical, and Prop_Masked SDCs. Figs. 10, 11, and 12 show the layer vulnerability values, precisely, AVF values for injections into RF site and PVF values for injections into IOA and IOV sites, respectively. Therefore, for each layer, we calculate the DUE, Masked, Critical SDC, Non_critical SDC, and Prop_Masked. Fig. 10 shows our experimental results for the hardened version of RF mode injections, which is specifically kernellevel hardening. Accordingly, only a few layers (1M, 8, 12, 14, and 41) produced inconsiderable amounts of Non_critical SDC (the overall is 0.715% AVF), while it shows that no produced Critical SDCs in other layers than Max-pooling layer, is about 20% AVF, in RF injections, errors who propagate through layers cannot get masked in the middle. Therefore, it produces zero Prop_Masked. Figs. 11 and 12 , on the other side, show PVF values of IOA and IOV modes, respectively. With these two injections, DUE errors always much less than in RF mode; and that is as explained in Section V-B, i.e., due to the difference in the level of the injection. Consequently, there is only 12.23% and 6.256% PVF of the DUEs for the two injection modes, respectively. Furthermore, unlike RF mode, in both instructionoutput injections, most of the layers generate Masked SDCs. Where there is about 5.2% and 4.56% PVF was Prop_Masked for IOA and IOV, respectively. We found that at least 78% of the Prop_Masked SDCs have been masked at the last layer (Softmax layer), 20% at layer 1 (Max-pooling layer), and the 2% has been masked by different mid-layers. All the Prop_Masked SDCs of the layer0 are masked by the Max-pooling layer.
As our main target at this point is the SDC and its types, we will take a close look at the criticality of the SDC errors and evaluate them. We find that, with IOA injection (Fig. 11) , the generated Critical SDCs were zero, while masking more than 87.6% PVF of the SDC errors. For IOV mode (Fig. 12) , on the hand, only 0.104% PVF of the Critical SDCs have been produced, while more than 93.3% of the injected errors were masked. Proving the effectiveness of our hardening technique. Table 4 , which extracted from Figs. 10, 11, and 12 summarizes percentages of the obtained errors for each of the injection mode, before and after applying our hardening solution. It shows that our strategy has significantly reduced the percentage of Critical SDCs that cause misclassification to our model. Where the proposed solution has reduced from 4.2% to 0.104% in IOV mode, 1.1% to 0% in IOA injection, and from 0.52% to 0.065% in RF mode. In fact, even the obtained 0.065% of the RF mode belongs to the Max-pooling layer, which is not one of the most vulnerable kernels, thus, it has not been hardened.
It is worth remembering that although unhardened kernels, such as Activation_array, Scale_bias, and Copy_gpu, do not belong to the best candidates to harden, they still generate a small amount of SDC errors. Therefore, when we re-evaluate error propagation through layers, even after applying our selective hardening, we should find some tiny amount of SDCs remained, which belong to the unhardened kernels within these layers.
By applying our selective-hardening strategy, which is by triplicating only the kernels with unreasonable KVFs within each layer, we can correct more than 93% of the errors with a performance overhead of only 5.34%, which is quite efficient comparing to plain TMR. It is worth noting that even the average overhead introduced by a full algorithm duplication (i.e., full DMR) is in the range of 150%-90% [11] , which is a non-negligible overhead compared to our strategy's cost.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have analyzed and evaluated error resilience of ResNet models. First, we have compared the error resilience of three different ResNet models (ResNet-50, ResNet-101, and ResNet-152) through SASSIFI. With our model depth analysis, we have shown that the additional layers in the ResNet-152 model to be more prone to soft errors than ResNet-50 and ResNet -101. Second, we have performed an in-depth analysis of ResNet from its layers to the kernels in order to rank the sensitive portions of the algorithm. The rate of critical SDCs, which cause misclassification, is demonstrated to be as high as 4.2%. With our layer vulnerability analysis and the way errors propagate in ResNet, we found that the vast majority of the errors come from Convolutional and Shortcut layers. Nevertheless, the input size, filters counts, and layer's position in the network have a direct impact as well, such as in layers 4, 8, and 12 in Figs. 10, 11, and 12. Within each of the vulnerable layers, we further investigated kernel vulnerability. By analyzing the kernel vulnerability, we found that not every kernel is prone to radiation-induced errors. Accordingly, we were able to confidently determine the most vulnerable kernels of the ResNet model, which are Normalize_gpu, Add_bias, Shortcut_gpu, and Im2col_gpu.
Third, we have proposed an approach based on the well-known TMR technique to tune the trade-off between the model's reliability and its performance through hardening the carefully-selected kernels. Finally, we have validated our approach by re-evaluating the hardened model from layer and kernel perspectives. With our approach, we can achieve SDC error mitigation as high as 93.38%, 87.63, and 63.02% in SASSIFI's three modes IOV, IOA, and RF, respectively. More importantly, the percentage of the Critical SDCs has been reduced from 4.2%, 1.1%, and 0.52 to 0.104%, 0.0%, and 0.065%, respectively. Thus, a confident selection of which portions of a model to harden is a substantial step to achieving reasonable efficiency.
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